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RECENT CASES
CARRIERs-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-NoTICE TO PASSENGER.-FRENCH
V. MERCHANTS' & MINERS' TRANSP. Co., 85 N. E. 424 (MASS.) .- Held, that
defective eyesight is insufficient to excuse passenger from acquainting her-
self with the contents of her ticket, but that she must have it read to her.
The more moderate rule appears to be that by mere acceptance of
ticket, the purchaser does not bind himself to all terms printed thereon in
absence of actual knowledge of them. Kent v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., IO
West. Rep. 459 (Ohio); Potter v. The Majestic, 56 Fed. 244. In like
manner, the burden of proof of passenger's knowledge rests upon the rail-
road, Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; so that where a
passenger is unable to read and no explanation is made by agent of rail-
road, the .terms on ticket are not binding. Mauritz v. N. Y., L. E. & W.
R. Co., 23 Fed. 765. The harsher rule is, that a passenger is bound by
conditions whether read or not. Boylan v. Hot Springs R. Co., 132 U. S.
146; and likewise by the legal effect, whether known or not. Gulf C. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Riney, 92 S. W. 54 (Tex.). The most reasonable rule,
however, seems to be that a passenger should be bound only where it is
carelessness not to have read the terms of the ticket or to have had them
read to him. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Nicholai, 42 Ind. App. 1i9;
Aplington v. Pullman Co., 97 N. Y. S. 329.
CONTEMPT-CRIMINAL INTENT-EsSENTIALITY.-STATE v. HOWELL, 69
ATL 1057 (CoNN.).-A newspaper editor and manager was not aware of
the publication in his paper of certain articles tending to obstruct the
administration of justice. Held, that he could be convicted of contempt of
court for such publication.
The offense "contempt of court" has many of the important character-
istics of common law crimes. For example, proceedings for contempt have
for their purpose the punishment of wrongdoers. Ex parte Gould, 99 Cal.
36o. And the offense is one which may be pardoned. State v. Sauvinet,
24 La. Ann. I19. But inasmuch as the offense is one against, the organs of
public justice, and is therefore a special and peculiar public wrong, it has
some essential differences from the ordinary common law crimes. For
instance: A conviction for contempt of court is no bar to proceedings
for criminal conspiracy on the same cause, since the contempt proceeding
is a special one. State v. Ossulaton, 2 Stra. Iio7. And for the same reason,
criminal intent, which is so important to the ordinary common law crimes,
is not necessary to a conviction for contempt of court. People v. Wilson,
114 Mass. 230; People v. Wilson, 64 I11. 195. The case at hand illustrates
this difference; and it is one of a very few cases where there has been
conviction for constructive acts alone
DAMAGES-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-INJURIES TO THE PERSON.-MORRIS
V. ST. PAUL Ry. Co., 117 N. W. 5oo (MINN.).-In estimating the damages
in an action for injuries to a person resulting in a miscarriage it was held,
that the pain and suffering which the mother would have suffered when
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the child was born in the natural course of events, cannot be deducted
from the pain and suffering occasioned by the miscarriage, which resulted
from the defendant's negligence.
The general rule in these cases undoubtedly is that whether the
defendant's conduct be wanton and intentional, or negligent merely, he is
liable for the entire consequences of his tortious act, including
the woman's suffering and impaired health due to and conse-
quent upon the miscarriage. Mann Car. Co. v. Dupre, 54 Fed.
646; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 3o8. It has been said, however, that
the measure of damages is the difference between what actually was suf-
fered as a result of the injury and miscarriage, and the pain and suffering
which would have been suffered if the child had been born at the proper
time. Joyce, Dann, S. 185. The authority for this rule seems to be a
statement in Hawkins v. Front St. Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 6oo, where it is
said, "and so we have no doubt that, if Mrs. Hawkins shows impairment
of health and suffering growing out of the death and premature birth of
her child, which would not have attended its birth at the usual time, . .
respondents can recover for her suffering and impaired health." See also,
Berger v. Railway Co., 95 Minn. 84.
FRAUD-DECEPTION CONSTITUTING FRAUD.-ALDRICH v. SCRIBNER, 117
N. W. 581 (MICH.).-Held, that if a representation is false in fact, and
actually deceives the one to whom it is made, it is actionable fraud, though
made in good faith and with every reason to believe it is true. Mont-
gomery; Blair and Ostrander, JJ., dissenting.
The general rule is that an action is maintainable for damages sus-
tained from a false representation made by the defendant knowing it to
be false, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly without caring whether
it be true or false. Derry v. Peek, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 327; Cooper V
Schlesinger, III U. S. 148; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124. There carr
be no fraud without moral delinquency. Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J.
Law, 656. It is not enough to show that the representations were made
through mistake, ignorance, or carelessness, or without reason to believe
that they were true. Mentzer v. Sargeant, 115 Ia. 527. In Michigan it is
immaterial whether the false representation is made innocently or
fraudulently, if by its means the party to whom it is made is injured.
Totten v. Burhans, 91 Mich. 495. False statements have been held action-
able if they were made without reasonable grounds to believe them to be
true. Trimble v. Reid, 97 Ky. 713; Rowell v. Chase, 61 N. H. 135; Ramsay
v. Wallace, ioo N. C. 75. If the defendant stated as of his own knowledge,
material facts susceptible of knowledge which were false, although he did
not know them to be false, that he believed them to be true is no defence.
Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195; and this Mass. doctrine has been
followed in Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Hampshire and New
Jersey.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-VASTE-LIABILITY OF LESSEE-ACTS OF
STRANGER.-RIMOLDI v. HUDSON GUILD, IiO N. Y. SuPP. 88r. Held, that
removal by a stranger of things fixed to the freehold without knowledge
of the lessee does not render the latter liable for voluntary waste.
The courts seem to differ on this question, but still the decided weight
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of opinion is against the above decision. Powell v. D. S. & G. R. Ry. Co.,
x6 Or. 33; contra, Coale v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry Co., 6o Mo. 227.
In general, the courts hold that an action on the case may be maintained
either against the tenant who suffered the waste or the stranger who com-
mitted it. Parrott v. Barney, Fed. Cas. No. IO,773a. The courts that hold
the lessee responsble hold him so for all injuries done during his term,
with the exception of the acts of God or of public enemies and the acts
of the lessor himself. White v. Wagner, 7 Am. Dec. 674 (Md.); I Wash.
Real Property, § 34, 35. This liability rests upon the principles of public
policy. Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 230; Randall v. Cleaveland, 6 Conn. 328.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS-
AcTs OF SERVANT.-CUNNINGHAM V. CASTLE, III N. Y. SuPP. I057.-Where,
in an action for injuries through being struck by an automobile owned by
the defendant and operated by his chauffeur, it appeared that the chauf-
feur was using the machine at the time of the accident for his own pur-
poses, it was held, that defendant was not liable. Houghton, McLaughlin,
J. J., dissenting.
The general rule of law that one person receiving an injury by the
negligence of another, must look for his remedy to him by whose negligance
the injury was occasioned, is subject to the exception, that if the negli-
gent person is a servant acting within the scope of his master's business,
the person sustaining the injury can hold the master responsible. Chcago,
Ry. Co. v. West, 125 111. 320; Ochsenbein v. Shapley, 85 N. Y. 214. But
the test of the master's liability in these cases is not whether a given act
was done during the existence of the servant's employment, it is whether
such act was done by the servant while engaged in the service of, and while
acting for the master in the prosecution of the master's business. Lima
Ry. Co. v. Little, 67 Ohio St. 91; Brown v. Jarvis, 166 Mass. 75.
RAILWAYS-ACcIDENTS AT CROSSING-EvIDENcE-ADMISSIBILITY-PRIOR
SIMILAR OCCURRENCE.-WOoDWORTH V. DETROIT UNITED RY., 116 N. W.
549 (M'ICH.).-Held, that where the decedent's wagon caught between rail
of the track and the planking of a diagonal crossing so that a car ran into
it, evidence that other rigs had been struck at the same crossing from the
same cause within two years is admissible, notwithstanding the defendant
admitted full knowledge of the condition of the crossing for six months
previous to the accident in question, for it was proper to show negligence
in view of the danger.
Testimony may be given by witnesses familiar with the place of the
accident as to narrow escapes they have had at the same crossing, for
the purpose of showing the nature of the crossing. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co.
v. Netolicky, 67 Fed. 665. But in Menard v. Bos. & Me. Rd. Co., i5o
Mass. 386 evidence offered to show that other accidents had occurred at
same crossing within a short time were not admissible. And evidence
of similar occurrences on other occasions is not admissible to
raise a presumption that the place where the accident occurred
was defective or dangerous. The Clev., Col., Cin. & Indianapolis
Ry. Co. v. Walnut, 114 Ind. 527; Tiffin v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co.,
93 S. W. 564 (Ark.). So, in an action for injuries received at a crossing,
it is not competent for a witness to testify as to the occurrence of an
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accident to himself at the same crossing several years before, as such tes-
timony, though tending to prove that the crossing was dangerous, would
not tend to prove negligence of the railway company, which could be pre-
dicated only by the manner in which the train was run across the crossing.
Cohn v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. Supp. 986.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-PURCHASE OF REALTY-DEFECT OF TITLE.-
BODCAw LUMBER Co. v. WHITE, 46 So. 782 (LA.).-Held, that in an action
for specific performance, to the end of compelling a buyer to accept title,
the court declines to grant the relief asked on the ground that the title
tendered is suggestive of future litigation.
Formerly a court of equity would not refuse a decree for specific per-
formance on the ground that the title was doubtful and liable to attack,
where the court itself entertained a favorable opinion. But it is now an
invariable rule that a purchaser shall not be compelled to accept a doubt-
ful title. Bispham's Principles of Equity, § 378 (7th Ed.). While the
general principle is settled, courts have not given a uniform meaning to
the word "doubtful." It has been said that the title, like Caesar's wife,
ought to be free from suspicion. Sug. V. and P. 577 (8th Am. Ed.) ; but
in Kullman v. Cox, 167 N. Y. 411, specific performance was decreed al-
though three of seven judges thought the title doubtful. In England,
Pyrke v. Waddingharn, IO Hare I, has defined a doubtful title as one which
may be reasonably questioned by competent persons although the court
entertains a favorable opinion. And this is the usual statement of the
rule although the Vice Chancellor in Rogers v. Waterhouse, 4 Dreed 329,
says that the opinion of the court in favor of the title must be so clear
that it cannot be apprehended that another judge may form a different
-opinion. And see Chauncey v. Leorninister, 172 Mass., 340, which seems
to regard the mere possibility of an adverse claim sufficient to render
a title doubtful. It has been said that if the doubts are upon a question
connected with the general law, the court is to judge whether the general
law is or is not settled, if the doubts arise upon the construction of a
particular instrument, the court will not resolve the doubt, but will refuse
specific performance. Pyrke v. Waddingham, supra. Followed by
Alexander v. Mills, 6 Ch. 124, holding that the court is bound to say one
way or the other what is the general law, including the construction of
an Act of Parliament. But this has been qualified by In re Thackway, 40
Ch. D. 34, which declared that it must appear that even as to construction
of general law, there are no decisions or dicta of weight which show that
another judge might come to a different conclusion. And this view is ably
supported in a well-considered opinion in Lippincott v. Wikoff, 54 N. J.
Eq. 107.
